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IN THE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES ' 
JOHN LATSIS (also sometimes known 
as "LATSES"), 
Deceased. 
Case No. 7954 
RESPONDENT UTAH SAVINGS & TRUST 
COMPANY'S BRIEF 
Appellants by petition in this former probate pro-
ceeding, which was closed in 1945, are seeking to pro-
ceed separately against administrators who were then 
expressly discharged by decree of the Court, as if they 
were still acting, and then by such petition, to set aside 
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2 
that same decree both as to the distribution of the estate 
then made therein and also as to the then express dis-
charge of these two administrators. 
STATEMENT 
Here the effort of the appellant brief is to reverse 
the trial Court's order dismissing their said petition. 
The argument ignores the most fundamental grounds of 
support for this order, and also disregards certain stat-
utes and facts upon which the order below was princi-
pally based. 
The statement of facts is only slightly inaccurate 
in what is stated, but it conveys an incomplete under-
standing by misconstruing portions of the record taken 
out of context, and by omitting important portions there-
of. 
We can call attention to these matters by followmg 
appellants' points in the same numbered order, and then 
bringing in the relevant omitted and additional matters 
where these seem to apply. 
We will, therefore, answer their five points in the 
order as argued by appellants. We will state our posi-
tion very briefly under each number and then present 
our contentions under their point numbers in the same 
order. Under "Point 5" we will discuss the five grounds 
of our motion to dismiss, which was sustained by the trial 
Court. If any of these grounds were properly sustained, 
the order of dismissal of appellants' petition wa~, of 
course, proper. Appellants have attacked none of these, 
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3 
except by indirect reference to the subject matter of two 
of them. 
\Ve deny that appellants would be entitled to a re-
versal even if they were correct in any, or in all, of their 
first four points, but shall nevertheless show wherein 
they are wrong on these. 
AS TO POINTS 
To indicate the conflicts between us here, we will 
very briefly state our position on each of appellants' five 
points, as follows: 
1. Claims of appellants have been settled accord-
ing to the stipulation, and on their own plan of carry-
ing it out. 
2. Decree of distribution was carried out, as it 
is therein recited, and before respondent was discharged. 
3. Settlement did not fail but was carried out as 
agreed and directed to be done by appellants. 
4. Appellants are not entitled, and could receive 
no benefit from a distribution according to their claim 
of succession, and, if they were, respondent can do 
nothing about it. 
5. The order dismissing appellants' petition was 
legal and proper and each of the grounds of respondent's 
motion sustained by the Court were well taken. 
POINT I 
This point goes to the question as to whether the 
decree of distribution was in accordance with a prior 
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4 
stipulated settlen1ent of the appellants' claims. \Ye dis-
agree, as to whether it was, and, also, as to whether it 
needed to be. 
At the beginning of appellants' discussion of this 
(p. 12) they question the authority of Mr. Cotro-)Ianes 
(who, for the sake of brevity, will be referred to herein-
after as Mr. "C-M") to make the settlement. It is stated 
(p. 13): 
"There is serious doubt in our minds as to 
whether Mr. Cotro-Manes, in the first place could 
enter into such a stipulation where no notice was 
given to the heirs * * * concerning the appoint-
ment of an attorney to represent them." 
Since similar intimations occur throughout their 
brief, and since Mr. C-M's actions on behalf of appel-
lants were the basis for the proceedings taken and orders 
entered by the Oourt as to appellants, we will attempt 
to clear this matter up at the outset. 
His appointment to act for these heirs, who are now 
the appellants here, was pursuant to our State Statute, 
as follows: 
75-14-25. Attorney for minors and nonrfsidenfs. 
At or before the hearing of petitions "" "" "" for letters 
testamentary or of administration, for "" "" • settlements, 
partitions and distributions of estates, • • • and all other 
proceedings where notice is required or prescribed, • • • 
the court may, in its discretion, appoint some competent 
attorney at law to represent in all such proceeding~ all 
persons interested who are minors and have no gen-
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eral guardian in the county, or who are nonresidents 
of the state, and all those interested who, though they are 
neither such n1inors nor nonresidents, are unrepresented. 
The order must specify the names of the parties so far 
as known for whom the attorney is appointed, and he 
is thereby authorized to represent such parties in all such 
proceedings and su,bsequent to this appointment. The 
attorney 1nay receive a fee, to be fixed by the court, for 
his services, which must be paid in the case of estates of 
decedents out of the funds of the estate as necessa.ry 
expenses of administration, and upon distribution may 
be eharged to the party represented by the attorney, 
* * * 
There is nothing here, or anywhere else that we can 
find, requiring notice of his appointment. None is "re-
quired or prescribed." And the very purpose of the 
statute appears to refute any such contention. 
It is plainly intended to give the Court "discretion" 
to take care of situations where "minors" without guard-
ians and "non-residents of the state," could not be ex-
pected to readily receive notice or to consult or act for 
their protection, at least could not do so without intoler-
able or interminable delays. 
And since it was common knowledge at the time 
that Greece was overrun by Communists and was itself 
in a state of Communist revolution and war, this was 
clearly a proper place for the Court to exercise this dis-
cretion. 
If notice to and approval by the persons to be repre-
sented were a necessity. this statute would never have 
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been needed, and it can serve no useful purpose. By 
this statute he was thereafter authorized in "all * * * 
proceedings where notice is required or prescribed." 
In any event the intent and meaning of this statute, 
75-14-25, is clear as to Mr. C-M's authority here, and to 
the effect that: 
(1) He was thereby, and by his appointment there-
under, "authorized to represent such parties in all suclz 
proceedings subsequent to this appointment," and all the 
proceedings involved were subsequent, and 
(2) That "such parties" were the same as the ap-
pellants who are now here complaining, and the father 
and predecessor in interest of two minor appellants, and 
(3) That the "such proceedings" to which he was 
expressly so appointed to represent them were the 
"settlements, partitions and distributions of estate." And 
these are exactly the things he did represent them in. 
This statute, therefore, settles the question of his au-
thority here. What he did, was then in legal effect, done 
by appellants themselves. 
In State v. Dist. Court, 85 P. 1022, the Montana Su-
preme Court held that the appointment by the Probate 
Court, in this situation, of a guardian ad litem under 
statutes similar to ours, as to such guardians, was void 
since their probate statute, which appears to be in the 
exact language of our 75-14-25, covers and .. is exclu-
sive" as to the like appointment of legal representatives 
in probate proceedings, and points out that California 
and some other Courts have also so held. 
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Speaking of the purpose of this statute, one cited 
California Court said: 
"Now, the attorney for minors in probate 
proceedings is to represent the minor, and so far 
as he is concerned, to conduct and control the pro-
ceedings." 
Since appellants have made no effort to support 
either their intimations as to lack of authority of Mr. 
C-~1 or the constitutionality of the statute or of his ap-
pointment thereunder, we do not feel called upon to fur-
ther refute such intimations. However, in the following 
cases the Courts have made pertinent observations on the 
question of such constitutionality of appointment: 
In Re Esta.te of Lux (Cal.) 66 P. 30; 
Learch v. Pierce (Cal.), 29 P. 239; 
In Re Estate of Roarke (Ariz.), 68 P. 527. 
In each of the last two cases the Supreme Courts 
of these states say, as to the order of appointment: "The 
order may be made ex pa.rte and no notice of the entry 
thereof is required." 
And further, this appointment in the exercise of 
discretion by Judge Ellett (R. 240) and the right of 
Mr. C-ni thereunder to represent these heirs, was there-
after recognized by three other Judges of the lower 
Court; Judges Van Oott, Crockett and Bronson. 
And this appointment and this settlement were not 
instigated or promoted (R. 2-±3-253) by the administra-
tors against whom appellants are complaining. The ad-
ministrators' attorney in fact made to the Court a sug-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
gestion that such an appointment may not be nece~sary 
(R. 24) and he raised the only questions that were raised 
on the settlement and then indicated to the Court the 
possibility that these heirs 1night finally realize an 
amount of some $1,100.00 more than appellants were 
then seeking to agree to and get (R. 249-250). It now 
appears that his estimate was perhaps not as good as 
that made by the appellants' representative. 
And time then seemed important too, because :Jir. 
C-M satisfied the Court that delivery of at least some 
of this money could be made immediately (R. 257) and 
that it was urgently needed by these foreign heirs, as 
well as by the local heir, who was also a party to this 
settlement. 
The "settlements, partitions and distributions" now 
complained of were promoted (R. 249) and procured (R. 
246-253) by and for the appellants themselves. This re-
spondent, as administrator, had no interest whatsoever 
in this. 
Meaning and Effect of Stipulation: 
A better understanding of the portion of the stipu-
lation and order in question here will be obtained if some 
background is considered. 
Just before the Court appraisal had been filed 1\fay 
13, 1944 (R. 38) fixing the gross value of the estate at 
$76,209.16, Virginia Latsis, acting personally by her own 
attorney (R. 45), filed l\Iay 12, 19-t--t a petition (R. -+~) 
claiming that an item of $12,000.00 which got into the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
bank account of the decedent, and $5,990.23 (R. 43) of 
which had been invested by decedent in a lower State 
Street property, belonged to her and not to the estate. 
It recited that she had sold Davis County property de-
rived from her mother's estate for this $12,000.00. This 
claim wa8 indisputable and was found by the trial Court 
to be true (R. 67), but Judge Crockett at that time ap-
parently upon a "presumption of gift" theory decided 
against her (R. 67), and after findings and judgment, 
but before appeal could be taken, a stipulation was en-
tered into between the litigants and was consented to by 
the administrators (R. 89) and granted by the Court, 
setting aside this decision. This litigation had been en-
tirely between the heirs represented by Mr. C-M on one 
side, and the widow represented by her attorney, Mr. 
Alke E. Diamant, on the other. The administrators, as 
such, had no interest in it. 
The order on this stipulation follows after the sig-
natures to the stipulation (R. 90). It reversed the pre-
vious decision as to the $12,000.00 as between the liti-
gating parties, but reserved the question as to how it 
should be considered by the State Tax Commission for 
tax purposes. The Judge also added, after Iiis signa-
ture, the following statement which he initialed: 
"Subject to approval by the probate division 
of this Court as to the compromise above referred 
to." 
The "compromise above referred to" (R. 90) by the 
Judge is the stipulation of settlement now in contro-
ver~y. This stipulation is dated (R. 86) Dec. 12, 1944, 
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but was not filed until Feb. 13, 1945 (R. 88), just two 
days before the reversing of the $12,000.00 iten1, which 
was signed and filed Feb. 15 (R. 90). So these 1natters 
were handled together. The order approving this $10,-
000.00 settlement agreement was then signed; it was 
filed Feb. 27, 1945 (R. 97), after a hearing. 
The stipulation and the hearing thereon were di-
rected principally to the establishment by the appellants, 
through their representative, that the settlement of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) was a fair settlement 
as between them and the widow of the decedent. 
The appellants now place reliance (p. 13) upon a 
paragraph in the stipulation (R. 87) that the settlement 
"shall become binding and conclusive upon" the indi-
vidual heirs executing certain receipts or documents 
mentioned, and accepting their portion of the settlement 
fund. They contend this meant it could never become 
binding except upon these being first obtained. 
We are entirely unable to see how this statement 
at that time has any effect here now. Whether it is con-
sidered as a legal conclusion, or a correct recital of some-
thing they agreed would be the effect of such acts by the 
heirs, it did not limit the settlement in the first place, 
nor the further proceedings agreed to and taken. Cer-
tainly the parties making the settlement could, if they 
had wanted to, change their ideas as to how or when it 
should be closed. 
It was correct to say that the settlement would have 
become binding if the heirs so executed the documents 
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and accepted the money. This would be true whether 
such statement had been inserted in this stipulation or 
not, or whether there had been any stipulation at all. 
But, it doesn't follow that there was any agreement 
that the stipulation and settlement, as approved by the 
Court, would not be binding as an agreement until they 
personally so signed. There was no such statement, al-
though it would have been easy to make such, if so in-
tended. In fact, all the actions of all the parties to this 
stipulation, and of all the Judges who considered and 
acted upon this matter indicate an exactly contrary in-
tention. 
This agreement by all of the parties said (R. 86-7), 
"that it will be for the best interest of said estate, and 
particularly of the said four heirs, that a settlement be 
made at this time." 
If it had been the intention to have their approval 
before the settlement was made, there would have been 
no sense in the importance given to making the money 
available then, and there would have been no sense in 
proceeding to get the order approving the settlement at 
that time. Courts do not ordinarily approve and direct 
performance of agreements not yet fully agreed to by 
the parties, and which never may be. 
It must be kept constantly in mind too that this "set-
tlement," in so far as agreed to by Mr. C-M, was made 
by these appellants, just as if they had all been present 
and signed the agreement themselves. And so also were 
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all the acts thereafter taken by their representative 
pursuant thereto, their acts. 
This stipulation also said (R. 87) : 
"It has been agreed that the said four heirs," 
naming them, "will accept in full settlement of all 
of their claims, interest and demands, which they 
have, or might have had, as heirs at law of the 
said decedent, the sum of $10,000.00 to be paid 
as hereinafter agreed and provided. 
* * * 
"That the Court, upon hearing hereon, shall 
determine and fix the attorney's fees and charges 
of N. J. Cotro-Manes, as attorney representing 
the said four heirs by appointment of the above 
entitled Court, and shall direct the manner of 
disbursement of the said fund." 
So that the settlement was already agreed to, and 
the manner of disbursement, which is the thing appel-
lants are talking about, was not settled, but was to he di-
rected later, as it was. 
The Order of Feb. 27, 1945: 
Appellants (p. 13), after referring to this provision 
of the stipulation, say that the order "in like language" 
stated the same conditions. This is inaccurate. 'rhe 
order (R. 97) on this matter did not mention all the net:-; 
mentioned in the stipulation, but only one, it says :-;imply 
this: 
"It is further ORDERED that the said agrPP-
ment and distribution shall become binding and 
conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon 
the acceptance by hhn, or by his heirs at law, of 
said payments." 
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So that all 1nention of signing of docu1nents, including 
receipts and assignments as referred to by the stipula-
tion, are not in this order, at all. 
And here again, while it is a true state1nent of law 
to say that accepting the benefits of a settlement would 
bind the parties to it, again there is no order to the effect 
that the n1aking of the settlement depended upon, or was 
to await, such personal receipt. A contrary intent clearly 
appears in the order itself. 
This statement in the order, upon consideration, will 
be seen to have had one or two possible purposes. It 
could have meant that "acceptance" by their representa-
tive would have this effect. One of the four heirs was a 
minor who could properly accept only through his repre-
sentative. 
Otherwise, the purpose intended by this was to give 
some protection to the representative appointed by the 
Court for these foreign heirs. It was beginning to be 
common knowledge, as it definitely has since, that dur-
ing the war organized efforts were commenced to acquire 
the interests, or the right to represent the interests, of 
foreign heirs residing in enemy nations or in nations 
in enemy hands, and who were deprived of, or delayed 
in getting, their inheritances. The receipt by these heirs 
as referred to in the order, or the signing of documents 
as referred to in the stipulation, might protect the repre-
sentative of these heirs from thereafter claiming that 
their representative had made an unauthorized or an 
intentionally unfair settlement; or from denying receipt 
of the money. 
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This purpose is consistent also with the paragraph 
of the order quoted by appellants (p. 14) "that the said 
heirs shall furnish * * * receipts of said payn1ents,'' and 
that "their attorney shall procure" such receipts. 
Some more important provisions of this order on 
this matter are not referred to or quoted by appellants. 
The order says, "all the parties having joined in said 
petition and being represented, no notice was required" 
(R. 95), then refers to Mr. C-M as "representing the 
heirs other than Virginia Latsis." This is consistent 
with our position that these heirs were actually there 
In Court, at least legally. 
Then, after reciting that the settlement is a fair 
one and in the best interests of these heirs, and after 
fixing the fees of their representative, and in directing 
the distribution, the Court says (R. 96) : 
"It further appears that in addition to the 
services already rendered by the said attorney to 
the said heirs, additional services will be required 
in arranging and insuring the receipt by the said 
heirs of the amount to which each is entitled 
under the said settlemnt, to-wit, the amount of 
$2,000.00, after the deduction of said attorney's 
fees." 
Then the Court makes an unconditional order of 
distribution of this to "each" of these heirs and it is then 
ordered (R. 96) that such payments to the three lll•ir~, 
i.e., William and Nick, the brothers, and John, the 
nephew, naming them, 
"may be made***through the Hellenic Bank 
Trust Company of New York Cit)', or through 
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the American Express C01npany, 'whichever 
source is selected by the above mentioned attor-
ney for the heirs, and that the issuance and deliv-
ery of checks to such source SHALL R,ELIEVE 
THE AD~IINISTRATORS HEREIN FROM 
FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY THEREFOR." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
This was pursuant to the agreement (R. 87): ''that 
the Court***shall direct the ma.nner of disbursement 
of the said fund." 
Thus, the Court did not, as contended by appellants, 
require these administrators to make delivery to these 
heirs, or to procure any documents from them. This 
mention of "acceptance" in the order had no connection 
with the administrators. This matter was left up to 
their representative, and he was paid for doing it. We 
don't see ho-w there can be any dispute about this. The 
final decree makes this conclusive. 
The appellants then proceed to argue (p. 14) that 
the Court was without jurisdiction to modify this order 
of Feb. 27, 1945, by the final order of distribution and 
discharge of Oct. 9, 1945. The answer is, the Court 
did have jurisdiction to modify it, and also that the 
Court didn't modify this or any order. 
We agree that the Whitney case cited (p. 16) held 
that probate proceedings, as here, are proceedings in rem 
and would not be void for want of notice. We have a 
statute also to that effect. 
The argument that this case should be overruled 
and all the argument with relation to notice is beside 
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the point here. There is no allegation that the regular 
statutory notices were not given throughout. It is con-
tended (p. 17) such final notice was ihsufficient because 
it didn't tell the heirs "of the contents of the petition" 
for distribution. If this were necessary every decree 
of distribution, we think, entered at least for the last 
40 years in the District Court here is invalid. The 
notice sent to these heirs describes the petition as one 
(R. 105) asking for "the settlement of the final account 
of said administrators and for the distribution of the 
residue of the estate to the persons entitled and dis-
charge." That is what it was. It has not been the 
practice to do more than this and it is not required. 
Furthermore, this order and this decree plainly 
could not be affected by this claim by reason of statutes 
which we can better discuss later under Point 5, in dis-
cussing the grounds of our motion, and appellants were 
represented. 
Appellants repeatedly say that the order of Feb. 
27, 1945 "was conditional." They must mean that the 
delivery of the money to the heirs meant an actual 
delivery to and receipt by these personally, and that this 
was a condition precedent to the agreement taking effect. 
It must seem apparent from the record (R. 1:27 & :2-t-t) 
that this could never be done without an agreement first 
taking effect so as to get the money for delivery. And 
also, that a contrary interpretation was plainly given 
by all the parties who participated in procuring, in 
making, or in carrying out this order, or who had any-
thing to do with it. 
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This ·was con1pleted by the heirs acting through 
their representative duly and legally appointed. He also 
carried it out as ordered, as far as this was possible, 
prior to the tilne the appellants filed their petition here, 
and there is no indication that he will not complete the 
job. The n1oney is on savings deposit (R. 121) subject 
to his order. 
\Ve can see no application of the statute or the 
cases cited in the brief (p. 15-18) to this point of theirs, 
or to our motion to dismiss and the order of the Court 
appealed from. We will, however, notice some of these 
later. 
POINT II 
This numbered point by appellants (p. 26) is that 
the decree of Oct. 9, 1945 has not been carried out 
according to its terms. On this, the record shows that 
the decree of distribution has been fully carried out. 
Actually this point of theirs is based on the assump-
tion, (1) that Mr. C-M acted without authority in making 
the agreement of settlement; and (2) that it was never 
completed because the delivery of the money by the 
administrators and the receipt of it by these heirs was 
a condition precedent to the making or completing the 
contract; and now (3) that this condition precedent was 
"incorporated" (p. 19) into the final decree of Oct. 
9, 1945. 
We have considered the first two, and will now 
answer the third of these assumptions. This contention 
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not only rests upon the two incorrect assumptions dis-
cussed, but upon the far-fetched and erroneous assump-
tion that any such condition precedent, if it had ever 
existed, was "incorporated by reference" into this final 
decree, or, especially, that there is such a condition in 
this decree. 
Notice in their very first quotation therefrom (p. 
19) that the Court said the "settlement" agreement 
uwas made and approved." Not that an agreement was 
to be made if and when the heirs personally approved 
and accepted the money. 
In arguing this point appellants can make no claim 
that the final decree mentioned any of the references 
to documents in the stipulation of settlement. They do 
contend it adopted the Feb. 27 order, but this doesn't 
have any statement that it shall or shall not become 
binding upon the heirs signing any documents. They 
claim that what they term "conditions" in the Feb. '27 
order as to acceptance of the money were adopted and 
that this made the final decree conditional, and also 
charged the administrators with procuring personal 
acceptance of it by the heirs. 
On this it is argued that the final decree, b~r adopt-
ing from the Feb. 27 order an inference which they 
claim was there, that this agreement could not become 
such until there was a personal acceptance of the pay-
ments by the heirs, then itself said that the ,agreement 
had not been completed and would not be completed until 
payments thereunder were personally accepted. Thus 
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it is argued that, (1) this final decree says and means 
that the contract has not been completed, and (2) that 
this final decree adopted this meaning and so held, and 
(3) that, therefore, the ad1ninistrators violated the 
decree by not holding up all distribution as if no agree-
ment had been attempted. All these are untenable. 
If we have refuted the first, the others need not 
be considered. However, we deny that this language 
was ever intended to be or was adopted in any way or 
manner into this final decree, or that any such limita-
tion or condition, as is contended for, was ever men-
tioned, or adopted. Every provision of it, as well as 
its entry at all at that time, refute this. 
All that appellants say, by way of adoption by 
reference, is stated (p. 19) to the effect that this decree 
recited in substance that the files and records showed 
that by order dated Feb. 27, 1945 by Judge Van Cott, 
a settlement with these heirs was made and approved 
and then after stating the amount (R. 20) the decree 
mentioned the fees of Mr. C-M and referred to him as 
"appointed by the Court to represent said heirs, ***he 
to render the additional services required in arranging 
and ins11ring the receipt by said heirs of the amount 
which each is to receive under the seftlement." And 
this settlement is referred to not as one to be made, 
but one which "was made and approved." These had 
to be mentioned to be provided for. 
And then the other reference which is relied upon 
to support this theory of incorporation by refrence 
(R. 20): 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
"The settlement, payments and distribution 
and provision for distribution made pursuant to 
the order herein of February 27, 1945, and as 
hereinabove set forth is approved and allowed." 
Nothing is said "hereinabove" in this decree about any 
acceptance by these heirs, and nothing about any con-
dition precedent to the distribution made. It was made, 
then. And if there had been a condition to the comple-
tion of this contract, there certainly was plenty of 
occasion and opportunity for the parties, or the Courts, 
to have said so. 
Anyway what the F·ebruary order itself said, in 
directing "the manner of disbursement," as all the 
parties had agreed it should ( R. 87) was ( R. 96), as 
above quoted, that the administrators upon making 
the money available to the "sources" authorized to de-
liver it would be relieved of "further responsibility there-
for." And the final decree recited that funds for 
this had been made available, and then it discharqed 
the administrators. 
And when this final decree approved the "pay-
ments" and "provision for distribution made pursuant 
to the order herein of February 27," it was, of course, 
referring to this specific direction as to payment and 
distribution and to its order making absolute distribut-
tion of $2,000.00 to each of these heirs. 
What the Court in this decree did say and do, is at 
total variance with appellants' contention. It referred 
to the agreement "made and approved" as one whPrPh~· 
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said four heir~ were to receive the $10,000.00 "as their 
full share and in settle1nent of the claiins of each and 
all of said heirs against this said estate," and then goes 
on to recite the payments theretofore made thereunder, 
including the $500.00 each which had been forwarded, 
as arranged by their representative, through the express 
company. 
It. in harmony with the prior order, recited (R. 127) 
he was to receive the balance of his fee "when the prior 
distribution to each of said three heirs is completed." 
The decree also, after reciting that there was no 
cash in the estate to pay the balance of the money due 
on this distribution, recited that the widow had 
"deposited with the Utah Savings and Trust Company" 
the cash for these heirs and that this money for the 
heirs and their representative (R. 127) was "to be trans-
mitted to the said remaining heirs and paid to their 
attorney, in the manner heretofore ordered herein." 
And that, as quoted by appellants, their representa-
tive was "to render the additional services required in 
arranging and insuring the receipt by the heirs of the 
amount to which each is entitled to receive under said 
settlement." And 'also said, after reciting the use of 
the N. Y. Bank and the express company as in the prior 
order, that this representative was to be entitled to 
the balance of his fee when such manner of payment was 
completed. Thus, this Court, in referring to payments 
in the manner "heretofore ordered herein," referred 
to and covered all the provision of the order of Feb. 
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27, 1945 as to the manner of disbursen1ent of these funds, 
but no conditions. 
All this was consistent only with performance of 
a completed and approved agreement and it is useless 
to 'argue that either the Court or the parties intended 
to, or did adopt any interpretation contrary to this. 
Furthermore, the Court, again acting consistently 
with the prior order that the making of funds available 
for such distribution "shall relieve the administrators 
herein from further responsibility therefor," said 
(R. 133): 
"It is further ORDERED that the said Utah 
Savings and Trust Company and Virginia Latsis, 
be and they are hereby disch'arged." 
This decree was signed and entered Oct. 9, 1945. 
Coming to the cases cited (p. 20) under this point 
we have no doubt that a Court "may incorporate the 
provisions of the will" by "express terms" as was done 
in the Horton case there cited, and, of course, agree to 
the propriety of "resorting to a will to explain and 
interpret the decree" in respect to matters referred to 
in both. 
We deny that there is any "rule of law" or an~· 
authority for the claim that a decree by simply referring 
to a former proceeding or document approves and 
adopts everything that happened or which occurs therein. 
And, particularly, we deny that a decree can be 
assumed to have adopted a disputed construction of a 
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clause in a prior document when the whole decree and 
all that it does or s'ays is inconsistent with such con-
struction. 'Ye like son1e of the language of the Ewer 
case they cite (p. 23) that "a single phrase * * * apart 
fron1 the context* * *indefinite in itself" should not 
upset the plain meaning of 'a whole decree. And here 
the disputed clause is not even in the decree being inter-
preted, but, of course, such a clause would have been if 
such disputed condition had been intended to apply to it. 
Just as absurd, is the position taken by appellants 
(p. 23) that the decree of distribution which uncon-
ditionally (R. 128) said the balance of the properties 
"are hereby distributed" to the widow, was not intended 
to take effect until every one of these heirs h'ad accepted 
his money. 
POINT III 
This point again assumes the complete correctness 
of their first two points, and then again proceeds on 
the assumption that there has been no settlement at all. 
This emphasizes the inconsistency of quoting and 
relying upon a so-called "condition", which, they say, 
was a part of the agreement their representative made, 
and at the same time arguing that no agreement at all 
was made. 
It would seem that if the agreement of settlement 
was n1ade and approved by the Court that all the relief 
appellants can have is the money which they may accept 
and give the receipts which the Court directed them to 
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give (R. 97). Because, as the appellants quote in their 
brief (p. 30), the "Court has inherent power to enforce 
its order." 
Another thing thrown in to aid the confusion ( p. :2S) 
deals with the authority of Mr. C-~1 again. This half-
way assumes his authority to represent the heirs who 
were such at the time of his appointment and of the 
distribution of the estate, but says that: "Nick J. Latsis 
died leaving as his two minor children, John Nikolaou 
Latsis and Panagiotou Latsis, * * *. Mr. Cotro-Manes 
was not appointed to represent these minors or the heirs 
or the estate of Nick J. Latsis and could thus in no way 
stipulate on behalf of these minors in regard any settle-
ment agreement." 
This not only entirely disregards the realities of 
the appointment when the father was alive, but of the 
settlement which Mr. C-M did agree to and of his entire 
representation of the people then interested in making 
this agreement, and his efforts thereafter, and in recog-
nition thereof in making partial payment according to 
said ·settlement and the final order of the Court thereon, 
but it also ignores the order of the Court made to cover 
this exact situation (R. 97), as follows: 
"It is further ORDERED that if either of 
the above-named heirs shall have or shall become 
deceased before such distribution, that the said 
Hellenic Bank Trust Company, or the American 
Express Company, may be authorized to make 
delivery and payment to the heirs at law by 
succession of any such named heir who shall 
have or shall become ~o deceased." 
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And also our statute 75-12-7, to the san1e effect. 
l)nder this point the brief, in a totally irrelevant 
and perhaps inadvertent assertion, reveals the rea:son 
for the attack on this final decree, as well as what is 
really aimed at; it says: 
"The real properties of the estate have 
greatly appreciated in value since 1944 * * * ." 
And then pursuing this under Point IV, which we 
will later notice, they argue that the administrators 
must give them part of the real property. 
Appellants $10,000.00 Settlement was Fair 
"\Y e cannot resist answering briefly the effort here 
to influence the Court by the claim of appellants' brief 
(p. 27) that these heirs were shorted by the settlement 
their representative made for them. 
It is said that their calculations show that each of 
the four heirs share should have been $4,916.20 instead 
of the "stipulated * * * $2,000.00." The stipulation set-
tlement was actually $10,000.00 for the four, or $2,500.00 
each. 
The gross amount of the estate figure taken is that 
shown in the inheritance tax appraisement of $79,829.11 
(R. 99). These figures were set up April 12, 1945, some 
time after the settlement. The Court at that time had 
on file only the appraisal by its appraisers (R. 38) in 
the gross amount of $76,209.16. Both of these totals 
contain the $12,000.00 which had been in litigation and 
as to which the trial Court, as above pointed out, ex-
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pre-ssly found that this amount in decedent's bank 
account came by inheritance to the widow, from her 
mother and although it was first ordered to belong to 
the estate on a technicality, that order was reversed as 
to the estate. Appellants have taken no recognition of 
this item in making their claim here and while their 
representation to this Court is by no means as bad as 
that pre-sented to the trial Court (R. 169) in their peti-
tion, which the trial Court dismissed, it is still not fair, 
nor correct. 
The deductions of the widow's one-third (1;3) and 
of the expenses of probate stated in the brief are correct 
but it appears in the record and has been called to the 
attention of appellants' representatives here that there 
are other items of expense. The item of $1,636.45, which 
is not included in their deductions, was for State Inheri-
tance Tax (R. 98). 
It does not take in other items of expense, a princi-
pal one of which is the F·ederal Inheritance Tax payment 
which we have been unable to immediately locate in 
the record, but which was considered and not disputed 
in the trial Court as $2,221.04. Since this estate was 
settled long before the marital deduction now allowed 
on federal e-state taxes, it is apparent to the Court that 
it would be at least in that amount. These two items 
alone total $3,857.49. 
To the appraised value they add the total ''rent 
collections," of $9,771.32, without making any allowance 
for expenses at all. The record shows that all that wa~ 
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collected was paid out, but does not show the total that 
''"as used fr01n these collections for repairs, operations 
or expenses. ~Ir. C-~I did ascertain and represent to 
the Court that the farms had operated "at a loss" 
(R. 249) 
And these heirs' representative claimed nothing by 
reason of possible operation income (R. 253) because 
no one knew how that 'vas going to come out. 
\Ye point out also as another single item to be con-
sidered and which was to be considered, and which was 
considered on the settlement, the $12,000.00 (R. 80) 
included in the inventory as the value of Black Rock 
Beach Co. stock. While an outlawed mortgage of 
$9,670.00 (R. 81) was deducted in arriving at the above 
gross appraisal of $79,829.11. This $12,000.00 stock 
item was not deducted. This corporation did not own 
the Black Rock real estate which is "Black Rock" and 
inventoried separately (R. 78-79). This corporation was 
an operating company. 
On the hearing Mr. C-M, who showed that he had 
made thorough investigation of the assets and the possi-
bility of expenses and losses, discussed the real estate 
( R. 245) and showed that the bulk of this was a one-
half interest in an .old business property, which was 
somewhat in jeopardy. He pointed out (R. 244) that 
if any of the real estate could be sold it could not then 
be sold for cash and that by this settlement these appel-
lants were guaranteed $10,000.00 regardless of any losses 
or fluctuations or expenses. It will be recalled that the 
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widow accepted these risks, and assumed all expenses 
and costs. 
He also told the Court and it was true (R. 2-t5) that 
this Black Rock Beach Co. stock was 99% owned by the 
estate; that it had operated at a "considerable loss" the 
previous year; and that additional cash would have to 
be raised by assessment and put up if it continued to 
operate at all. It would seem that when representations 
as to actual values were made here appellants would 
have told exactly the extent of what that stock loss 
has been. But, outside of all of this, let's now take the 
figures that we have and take the full gross as set up 
by plaintiffs : 
Gross Estate ........................................................................ $79,829.11 
Add full rent collection -without any deductions........ 9,771.32 
TOTAL .................................................................................. $89,600.43 
Deduct the widow's $12,000.00, not belonging to the 
estate ............................................................................ 12,000.00 
$77,600.43 
Deduct widow's portion of real estate, as agreed to 
by plaintiffs, not inherited ........................................ 18,753.00 
$58,847.43 
Deduct expenses of administration, as agreed................ 12,350.24 
$46,497.19 
Deduct widow's first portion, by succession...................... 25,000.00 
$21,497.19 
Deduct State Inheritance Taxes and Federal Inheri-
tance Taxes, not included in expenses...................... 3,857.49 
$17,639.70 
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Of which these four heirs would he entitled to lj2 or 
$8,819.S5. So that if we stop at this point, and we can-
not see how the above iterns can be disputed, the settle-
ment of $10,000.00 agreed upon is almost $1,200.00 more 
than the value left. If we were to deduct even one-half 
of the $12,000.00 appraised value given to the Black 
Rock Company's stock it would leave only $5,800.00 on 
the highest valuation claimed for all four of these heirs. 
And if rents collected were used for operating expenses 
or losses nothing is left. 
The remaining matter to be noticed under this point 
(p. :28) is the incorrect statement that if Mr. C-M repre-
sented these heirs at all "such representation and the 
stipulation* * *were effective only until notice could be 
given to all of the heirs in Greece and until those heirs 
had opportunity to affirm the stipulation." But, as 
stated, all statutory notices w~re given and Mr. C-M, 
pursuant to the agency given him by the Statute 75-14-
25, participated in all these "settlements, partitions and 
distributions," and represented these heirs just as the 
statute authorized. He, in fact, promoted and brought 
about the very things now complained about. Notice to 
the heirs didn't affect his authority. 
The further statement in this connection (p. 28) 
that the "minor heirs" or the "estate" of Nick Latsis, 
who was himself alive when tliis settlement and final 
distribution were made, could, after his death, disaffirm 
it all because of lack of notice to them is too absurd to 
discuss. 
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The two cases cited at this point (p. 28-29) have 
simply no relation at all to the preceding staten1ents 
made, neither in the parts quoted, nor in any other part, 
so far as we can see. 
The Smith case decided the point that a settlement 
made for a minor, but not by any legal representative 
of his, still had to be repudiated in a reasonable time 
after he. came of age. 
The quotation under the citation of the Lupton case 
is a part of the Note in A.L.R. cited at 979 on this case. 
Of 'Course, we don't have matters of confidential relation-
ship, or of fraud or unconscionable practice, and the 
Lupton case holds that if we did the agreement would 
still not be void. A mere reading of the portion of the 
note preceding that quoted will show the absolute 
inapplicability of anything in that case. 
Then referring to the law, the brief (p. 29) states 
that Utah Law "did appear" to be clear that the adminis-
trator cannot be discharged until the estate has been 
fully administered. We simply assert that an adminis-
trator is discharged and his powers and duties end, when 
the District Court discharges him and distributes the 
estate from his control. If the Court errs in such distri-
bution and discharge that, of course, is another matter, 
but the decree stands until it is appealed or a:ttacked, 
and reversed. And the Utah cases cited do not support 
their statement, or conflict with the statement just 
made by us. 
In Re Barker's Guardianship quotes a concurring 
statement by Justice \Volfe, but does not :-~tate the 
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ground of the decision. There the defendant guardian 
had been collecting disability payn1ents for his ward in 
excess of $400.00 and had paid only $50.00 to the ward. 
Upon a doetor's certificate of restored competency to 
the ward, the guardian applied for and obtained an order 
of discharge. ~-\.n affidavit was filed, and an order to 
show cause entered and then the case was tried. 'rhis 
Court says: 
"as though a suit had been brought." 
It then cites another Utah case and says that that 
case held that where "'issues were properly drawn by 
appropriate pleadings, although it was not error to 
proceed to dispose of the contested question," it should 
be done aceording to the procedure of the Civil Code. 
Thus, in this case the trial proceeded without the 
question of procedure being raised. 
The second distinguishing feature pointed out by 
this Court is the application of 102-13-45 R.S.U. 1933 
(now 7.5-13-45) which is quoted and which provides that 
"upon complaint by any * * * ward * * * against 
anyone, suspected of having* * * embezzled or 
conveyed away any of the money, * * *belonging 
to the ward * * * may ci'te such suspected person 
to appear before it * * * and proceed with hin1 on 
such charge" etc. 
This makes it clear that this case never said or decided 
that an administrator here could not be discharged even 
if he still had possession of property of the estate, and 
since the record shows that this administrator had no 
:-~ueh possession because of the distribution by the Court 
prior to its discharge, and there is no claim that it now 
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has such possession, that case has no bearing. Judge 
\Volfe's comment quoted, simply adds that the Court 
may enforce its order independently of this statute. 
There is no order of the Probate Court as to this 
administrator which is attempted to be here enforced. 
The other Utah case cited for this so-called same 
rule (p. 30) is the Brooks' Estate case. We have no 
argument with the quotation. But here the Court 
specifically found that all of the real properties of the 
estate had been distributed by it and all other properties 
turned over by the administrators in accordance with 
the orders of the Court (R. 128). The Brooks' Estate 
case never discusses the point that the Court "cannot 
discharge" an administrator until he has finished admin-
istration, as con'tended by appellants. But, in that case, 
and exactly contrary to said contention, the Court cited 
the administrator to show cause why his appointment 
should not be revoked for certain defaults. He there-
upon resigned and this case is entirely devoted to the 
matter of requiring him to turn over to his successor 
ad1ninistrator 1nonies of the estate in his possession. 
As stated by this Court (30 P.2 at 1068) the question 
was did "the Court below * * * require appellant to 
deliver to the new appointed administrator more prop-
erty * * * than came into his possession as adminis-
b·ator." 
The remaining statements under this point are 
repetitions which have already been answered. 
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POINT IV 
Under this point appellants argue (R. :t2) that they 
are entitled to have delivered to them their proportionate 
share of the real property estate as if no order of dis-
tribution had been made. 
They gave this Court no clue as to what this admin-
istrator could possibly do to accomplish this son1e eight 
years after it has had any control of the property and 
after its distribution to private ownership. 
What they here appear to contend, that seen1s new 
or different, is that the Court, except by getting con-
veyances of the '•real property" from each heir, could 
not, and, therefore, did not 1nake any distribution, and 
did not close the estate. 
The statement quoted (p. 32) fr01n the Chamberlain 
case that "any property" of a decedent vests immediately 
in his heirs, "subject to administration and the payn1ent 
of debts" may, in some sense and for the purposes of 
that case, be correct. But, that any particular property 
may never reach them because of its being "subject to 
administration," is abundantly clear. 
The only thing that this Chamberlain case held on 
this was that the plaintiff heirs of a decedent had ~uf­
ficient interest to entitle them to contest a deed execu-
ted by such decedent, on ground of non-delivery thereof. 
So this statement was not necessary, and doesn't aid 
appellant. And, by 73-11-3, heirs are expressly given 
this authority in quiet title actions back as far as 1898 
when this provision was first enacted. 
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Then they cite (p. 32) Sec. 75-12-15, and this simply 
says that "partition or distribution" of the real estate 
1nay be made as in this chapter provided to persons to 
whmn it has been '·conveyed"by heirs, and that such 
shall be "assigned" to those entitled. They then argue. 
frmn this that shares of the estate, as referred to, can't 
be divested except by a conveyance, and, of course, this 
statute doesn't say that at all. 
Statutes illustrating the error of the broad claim of 
the definite investment of title in the heirs, and that 
such cannot be divested except by their conveyance, are 
quite numerous. For example: 
75-8-1 authorizes the Court to entirely exhaust the 
estate as to all heirs except the spouse, by "family 
allowances" to her; and 75-8-1 authorizes the same by 
"summary distribution." 
Then, 75-9-21 and other sections provide for such 
"divesting" by sales to pay funeral expenses or debts, 
old or new, and sales of real estate for these and other 
purposes, or even for distribution of the proceeds from 
real estate or other property, are authorized hy 75-10-1 
and succeeding sections. 
And, property in naine of decedent may be after-
wards conveyed by or under the direction of the Probate 
Court to any person entitled to have such property 
under 75-11-26 and 27, though legal title was vested 
in the decedent. 
The exclusive right of possession by 75-11-13, which 
i~ ordinarily a right attaching to title, is not in the heir:-;, 
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but it is in the administrators until final distributon and 
turning over; and under 7.5-1.:!-9 nothing n t all may vest 
in an heir where the decedent has nmde advancements 
to him prior to death. 
Before discussing the application of s01ne n1ore 
directly pertinent sections on this, we call attention to 
what appellants are claiming they are entitled to here, 
and to the impossibility of giving it to them. This claim 
that the share of each heir in1mediately vests, and that 
each heir is entitled to have it remain vested so far as it 
depends upon any statute or the Chamberlain or other 
cases referred to, applies alike to real property and 
personal property, so far as we can see. How is it that 
their claimed interest becomes real instead of personal 
property. We merely point this out, although it may 
have no particular importance. But what is it that 
appellants expect to get by continuing this probate, if 
it were opened up1 
The total inventory which they have referred to in 
presenting their claim as to valut of the properties of 
the estate (R. 100) is $80,000.00 in round numbers. We 
are not agreed as to what portion of all the estate would 
have gone to these collateral heirs according to these 
values, but we believe that we have demonstrated above 
that it would not exceed $10,000.00. This is Ys of the 
gross value, to the four of them, and each 1ft_ of Ys is 1j32 
and one 1j64 in each of Nick J.'s two minor children. 
Looking at the 1natter from the standpoint of pro-
portionate value, since each of these four, on this valu-
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ation, would be entitled to about $2,000.00 out of the 
$80,000.00 of property, each of these would have a 1j40th 
interest and each of Nick J's children a 1j80th one. 
And by their contention, this interest is in each and 
every piece of property, and it is beyond the power of 
the Court to get it out of any piece of property except 
by conveyance. 
\Vith this in mind, we invite the Court to look at 
the list of these properties (R. 77-81) and try to figure 
out how the Court could give one of thse heirs any bene-
fit at all frmn a 1j32nd or a 1j80th in any of the Butler-
ville properties in the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon 
or in the so-called Black Rock near the shore of Great 
Salt Lake, or in any other or all of these listed proper-
ties. The Court would have to do something about 
exactly as was arranged here in order to give these 
foreign heirs any possible benefit frorn this estate what-
soever. 
\Ve point out also here, and before proceeding to 
the statutes which authorize this, to additional complica-
tions which cannot be ignored. The character of the real 
estate belonging to this estate, and some of the compli-
cations with relation to it, and particularly the impossi-
bility in 1944 of selling any part of it outright for cash, 
was gone into at some length by Mr. C-M in presenting 
the appellants' proposal of compromise and settlement 
to the Court (R. 245-249). He said that none of the 
real estate could be sold outright for cash, but if sold 
could only be sold on a cash down-payment and future 
installment payment plan. 
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Thus, nobody can tell how much of this real estate 
it would have been necessary to sell under 7;>-10-1 to 
get cash to distribute to the collateral heirs, whether 
their proportion to be distribttted, absent the settlement, 
would have been Inore or less than $10,000.00. 
So, as represented to the Court, and particular!~· to 
try and help these heirs when n1oney would have been 
of the gratest benefit to them, their representative 
worked out an arrangen1ent by which the widow pro-
vided the cash, and the bank acknowledged the deposit 
thereof to the credit of their representative and for 
their use and benefit. Now of the money available and 
so provideo, $:.?,000.00 was paid to the decedent's brother 
here and Mr. C-M has apparently received his full 
$2,000.00. It is interesting, in this connection, to note 
that he, after the deposit, served notices as to this on 
the Utah Savings and Trust Company (R. 148), as a 
bank, and no longer dealt with it as an administrator. 
Also, as the decree pointed out, $1,500.00 additional 
had been withdrawn by him and forwarded through the 
"sources," as directed by the Court, to these heirs in 
Greece before the estate was closed. True, this ca111e 
back and was re-deposited in the saving account held 
in the bank for these people. But, assuming that this 
Court could and it did attempt to give these interests in 
the real estate to one or more of these heirs, what 
becomes of this money and who is entitled to it~ And, 
also, what about the money paid out~ 
The suggestion of the appellants' brief is that the 
brother here who took his $2,000.00 doesn't get in on 
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any assumed "increased value" In real estate, which 
they are striving for; nor will any other of these col-
lateral heirs who has or does become bound to the settle-
ment; and so, if there is one who doesn't sign up the 
Court has to look after his VESTED interest in all of 
these properties. 
We confidently assert that the law and our statutes 
do not require any such insane handling of such small 
fractional interests and that no Court controlling an 
estate, or any competent representative engaged in 
administering it, would willingly consent to any such 
handling of such matter. 
We call attention now to the following statutes deal-
ing with such situations: 
"75-12-12. Partition by referees. - When-
ever it is impracticable or inconvenient for the 
court to make a complete partition among all the 
parties in the first instance, or on petition of any 
interested person, the court, having first ascer-
tained and determined the shares or interests of 
the persons entitled, may appoint one or more 
dis-interested persons to act as referees for the 
purpose of making the partition. 
"75-12-16. When partition impracticable -
When the real estate cannot be divided with-
out prejudice or inconvenience to the owners, 
the court may assign the whole to one or more 
of the parties entitled to share therein who 
will accept it. The parties accepting the whole 
must pay to the other parties interested their just 
proportion of the true value thereof, or secure 
the same to their satisfaction, or in case of the 
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Ininority of such party, to the satisfaction of his 
guardian and the court having jurisdiction of the 
guardianship n1atter; and the true value of the 
estate umst be ascertained and reported by the 
referees. * * *" 
"73-1:2-17. Partition- Set off to party-
Payment.-When any tract of land or tenen1ent 
is of greater value than any one person's share 
in the same estate to be divided, and it cannot 
be divided without injury to the same, it may be 
set off by the referees appointed to 1nake parti-
tion to any of the parties who will accept it." 
The foregoing statutes call for and permit use by 
the Court of referees to be appointed to aid in fixing 
values of interests as partitioned to heirs, but we do 
not have that problem or that necessity because, as we 
have pointed out, the parties here all fully agreed on 
the partition matters, and the Court, after full inquiry 
(R. 252), accepted this agreement, and distribution. 
This was all done in matters of "settlements, partitions 
and distribution of estates" to which the Court, by 
75-14-25, had appointed the representative of these very 
appellants, with authority so to agree. It would have 
been idle and useless to then appoint a referee. And by 
accepting the values agreed to by the appointed repre-
sentative, the Court was enabled to give these foreign 
heirs some consolidated value and benefit from their 
inheritance, which they could use. 
And, we ask the Court to particularly note that 
under none of these statutes is it required tha.t any 7z eir 
make any conveyance of anything. So tha.t all of them 
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ref'Ltte appellants' contention on this. 
They empower the Court to avoid an "ilnpracticable 
or inconvenient" partition under 75-12-12, or "prejudice 
or inconvenience" to owners in distribution under 75-
12-16, and to give lands having a greater value than one 
heir's interest therein to another heir in making distri-
bution under 75-12-17; and, also, to give the full recog-
nition to the statutory authority of the representatives 
of minor and foreign heirs in all "settlements, partitions 
and distribu,tions" under 75-14-25. 
Thus, .if it may be assumed title would pass subject 
to ad1ninistration, still it is plain that title to any par-
ticular property may be completely divested in adminis-
tration, as it was here. 
The authorities cited by appellants in support of 
this point again do not have any bearing although they 
serve to indicate that counsel have tried to find some-
thing to support them. 
In re Mile's Estate, 223 P. 337., cited by them (p. 
33) has absolutely nothing to do with any question with 
which we are here concerned. It does hold that a pur-
ported conveyance of an interest in estate properties 
is not a conveyance, if it was not intended as such, but 
only intended to be given as security. This, of course, is 
sound law and it makes no difference whether the thing 
purported to be conveyed is property of an estate or 
any other property. 
In re Meyer's Estate, 238 P .2d 597, which the 
appellants assert {p. 33) held that "distribution of real 
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property shall be 1nade only to the heirs," doesn't seem 
to discu~~ real property at all, and ~ay~ nothing- about 
administrators or Courts being required to distribute 
only to the heirs. In that case, two foreign heirs of a 
foreign decedent in the enemy country of Gennany 
attempted to get rid of their interest in the estate in 
order to avoid its seizure by the Attorney General, as 
custodian of alien property, in this country during the 
war. They sent waivers of their interest in the estate 
properties here to two heirs residing in this country. 
These tried to assert that that waiver divested the alien 
German non-resident heirs and invested those who were 
here with the others interest. They also contended that 
the interest of the foreign heirs had never vested so as 
to become subject to seizure because they had not accept-
ed or claimed it. 
So that the Court can now see what the language 
quoted from Page 605 of 238 P. (2) had application to. 
There is a statement however (P. 605) which would 
take this case out of even the appellants' claim as to 
what the rule in California is as to agree1nents with other 
heirs, as here. The opinion says : 
"While the Courts of this state have deter-
mined that an heir may sell, assign, hypothecate 
or * * * may contract with other heirs with refer-
ence thereto * * * the question of whether an heir 
succeeding by descent may renounce or disclaim 
his inheritance has not been determined in this 
state." 
This, at least, recognizes that heirs may there contract 
with other heirs as was done here. 
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The statement (p. 36) that the final decree here did 
not determine heirship is just plainly erroneous. It sets 
forth the names, relationship and residence of every 
heir just as they are now claimed by appellants here 
to have been, at page 106, and then in the following pages 
states exactly what portions and what properties are 
to be received by each. 
POINTY 
Under this point appellants finally, make some 
reference to the order dismissing their petition from 
which they have appealed here, and thus they get a little 
nearer to the issues involved on this appeal. 
However, they still ignore entirely all but two of 
the five points of the motion to dismiss which their brief 
quotes (p. 10) and refer only indirectly to the two points 
not ignored. This motion (R. 153) is one to dismiss for 
these reasons: 
1. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
2. Lack of jurisdiction over the person. 
3. Insufficiency of process. 
4. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
5 Failure to join an indispensable party. 
These grounds are under our civil procedure and come 
under Civil Rule 12 (b). 
There is nothing new discussed under this point 5 
by appellants, but the claim of lack of the Court's juris-
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diction to enter the final decree of distribution and dis-
charge of the administrators, is here n1ore particularly 
emphasized. 
This emphasis on jurisdiction, is an effort to have 
this Court believe that the Lilnford case, which they cite 
(p. 37), is in point here. In so doing they ignore a 
number of distinguishing matters and particularly the 
statement of this Court in the first paragraph of the 
opinion there (207 P.2 at 1033) that: 
"The administratrix was not then and has 
not yet been discharged." 
This discussion also ignore~ statutes affecting their 
contention, which is based upon lack of notice and par-
ticularly 75-14-25, that the representative of these appel-
lants thereunder appointed, represents them in the very 
matters here involved, "and all other proceedings where 
notice is required or prescribed." 
Since this is the first opportunity that we have had 
to support the grounds of our motion, our position will 
be clearer if we briefly discuss these grounds in their 
order as above stated, and make reference to appellant's 
contention there. 
1. Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Subject Ma,tter 
The order appealed from dismissed a "petition 
directing the Court's attention" (R. 158) to alleged acts 
and proceedings in the probate file. This respondent was 
brought in only by service of an order to show cause 
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(R. 157) served Inore than six years after it had been 
expressly discharged. 
There were five matters of relief mentioned in the 
order to show cause (R. 155) but not one of these is 
claimed or discussed here, because appellants apparently 
realize that no relief could be granted on any of these. 
But the appellants argue throughout and in the 
end of the brief (p. 41) seek from this. respondent 
"further administration of the estate, including an order 
for final distribution in accordance with the laws of 
succession." They also describe their petition (p. 41) 
as one for completion of the probate proceedings. This 
background and their demand that respondent do some-
thing here are important. 
It is important, also to keep in mind that the charge 
that the administrators distributed the estate, or at-
tempted to, and that they should distribute the estate 
in some different manner, is entirely erroneous. This 
decree distributed the estate, and all of the statutes 
relating to distribution refer to it as a function of the 
Court, and 75-12-8 provides that after the proportions 
or parts are so distributed the heirs may recover posses-
sion from the administrator or any person having pos-
session; and Sec. 75-12-4 refers to the Court directing the 
adminstrator to deliver possession. These and other 
statutes clearly indicate that the Court distributes and 
exercises the power of distribution but that the adminis-
trator has the right of possession and the duty to deliver 
such, upon distribution. 
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The $10,000.00 agreed to, was expressly di::·d ributetl 
to the four heirs, and deliver~· charged to their agent, 
.\[r. C-:\I, by the Court order of Feb. :27, 1945 (R. 9G). 
In the final order provision was first n1ade for 
taking care of this distribution cmnpletely ( R. l:l.(i-1:27) 
and then the order, as to the property now claimed, said: 
·•rt is further ordered that all of the remain-
ing properties of the said estate, * * * are hereby 
distributed to Virginia Latsis, the surviving wife 
of the said decedent." 
Now if, when this order to show cause was served 
upon this respondent, it had atten1pted to do what 
appellants are asking the Court to require it to do, i.e., 
proceed with the administration, what could it have 
done~ If it filed another petition for distribution and 
got an order from the Court distributing some possible 
interest in the property here it would be totally ineffec-
tive for that purpose without divesting the parties in 
possession and having, at least, an apparent title. Even 
assuming that the order of distribution was void, and 
that this administrator could be reinstated, he could 
make any of the former properties of the estate avail-
able to these heirs only by proceedings against such 
persons holding it. It is obvious then that if he so 
attempted that he would have no interest sufficient to 
sustain an action to quiet title, and particularly, to 
acquire some small fractional interest therein, as to 
which it is claimed, this decree might be voidable or void. 
In 75-12-8, which says the Court in the decree n1ust 
name the heirs and the parts to which they are entitled, 
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says they may "sue for and recover" these from the 
administrator or any person having the same in 
possession. 
They appear to concede that probate proceedings 
are in rem, but the crux of their contention (p. 37) is 
that the Court couldn't get jurisdiction for this distribu-
tion by the ordinary notice because the distribution was 
not normal and that any "modified distribution" requires 
a notice which fully recites the contents of the petition. 
Apparently this, if so, would apply to any distri-
bution on any kind of partition arrangements as con-
templated by any of the statutes cited by us under 
Point IV. 
75-1-7 is one of the first statutes that they run dead 
into, because this recites that the Court has jurisdiction 
on final distribution without any notice as to it at all. 
Because of this and othe-r statutes defeating this claim, 
they attempt to escape by asking the Court to now over-
rule Barrette v. Whitney, 106 P. 522. There, in discuss-
ing this, in an action between two property owners, one 
of which had acquired some estate property, after a 
distribution without any notice, and had sold it to the 
other, this Court pointed out that in states whose statutes 
or decisions treat these proceedings as in rem the notice 
of the appointment of an administrator in the first 
place gave jurisdiction, and that such states, even with-
out a statute like ours, have held that notice of distri-
bution was not jurisdictional. The opinion (108 P. at 
525) says: 
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"In other words, frmn what is there said it 
would seem that the notice which is given upon 
the filing of the petition for letters of adn1inis-
tration is the jurisdictional notice, the giving of 
which, when given as required by the statute, 
brings not only the property, but the persons 
interested therein, within the jurisdiction of the 
Court." 
As seems to be agreed, this statute plainly says 
that this decree cannot be held void on account of ''any 
want of notice." And appellants appear to agree, as 
they must, that unless the decree is void it cannot be 
collaterally attacked, and even they treat their petition 
as such an attack. 
We have no jurisdiction of the property which is 
"subject matter" of this litigation, and can get none by 
this proceeding. 
Secondly, this statute, 75-1-7, says that "no objec-
tion" can even be taken on account of "want of notice, 
defect or irregularity," except on direct application to 
the same Court made at any time before distribution, 
or on appeal." So this bars them also. 
They want this Barrette case reversed, and this 
would not help them unless the statute was also repealed. 
Bot.h this statute and this case have stood since 1909 
when it was decided, and no change of pohcy has been 
indicated either by the legislature or by this Court. And, 
appellants have cited no decision to the contrary. 
They make statements here (p. 39) and on previous 
mention (p. 17) that this case has not been followed in 
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other jurisdictions and "appears to be contrary" to the 
weight of authority. They have cited no state which 
has refused to follow this statute, or even any other 
state having a similar statute. 
They have cited in support of this, 21 Am. Jur. P. 
655, Sec. 490. This does not ·support their contention 
except where the "statute makes such notice a juris-
dictional prerequisite," and a statement directly con-
trary to that they seek to support is made on the pre-
ceding page, 654. The statement of the law there is in 
exact accord with that of this Court in the Ba.rrette case. 
Now here in the brief do they cite a case involving any 
statute at all similar to ours, or any discussion of the 
effect or validity of any such statute. We submit, there-
fore, that this statute alone justifies the order appealed 
frmn. 
2. Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person 
Under this we will deal only with the jurisdiction 
of the respondent here; additional questions as to 
parties will be discussed under succeeding grounds. The 
appellants have ignored this ground of the motion 
entirely although it seems to us to be a propeT ground 
of motion and a serious one. 
Our statutes appear to recognize a clear distinction 
between the settlement of an account in probate and 
an order of distribution and discharge insofar as future 
proceedings are concerned. This Court has held that 
if the administrator has not been discharged an account, 
though approved by order of the Court, may under some 
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circumstances be opened up and revised or the admini::;-
trator required to inventory additional properties. See 
7.3-11-37 and rases cited. But where the estate has been 
finally settled and distributed and the administrator 
discharged by decree, no further proceedings can be 
taken in the estate by the adn1inistrator. The derree 
cannot be attacked collaterally, and the discharged 
ad1ninistrator can act only upon reissuance of letters 
reauthorizing him to serve as administrator. 
See 75-12-20. 
Obviously an administrator who has been discharged 
could not petition and, therefore·, could not act upon any 
petition fileJ in the closed estate without a reissue of 
letters. 
It appears that Section 75-12-19, which precedes 
the section just mentioned, sheds some light upon this, 
and also, that this section required the Court to n1ake 
the entry of discharge which it did make. Here the estate 
had been fully administered and the discharge order was 
preceded by an order which entitrely distributed it. Also 
everything else had been done and the order recited the 
performance of everything else required and the statute 
says that then "the Court must make a judgment or 
decree discharging him from all liability to be incurred 
thereafter." 
And the Court (R. 133) entered a specific order 
"that the said Utah Savings & Trust Company and 
Virginia Latsis be, and they are hereby, discharged." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
It is impossible for us to see how this respondent 
has any right or power to proceed in any way with 
relation to any of the properties of the former estate, 
and it follows that the Court does not have jurisdiction 
of him as administrator so as to direct his performance 
or any of the duties belonging to that office. 
In Banks v. Employers, 4 F.R.D. 179, on a similar 
motion, under the same Rule 12, the F·ederal District 
Court for Missouri ruled that an administrator after 
final settle1nent and discharge could not bring an action 
relating to any estate matters without being reappointed 
or appointed administrator de bonis non. The case at-
tempted was dismissed on motion. The Court said: 
"he can no longer act in his representative capa-
city." 
In Fistel v. Beaver Trust Co., 94 F. Supp. 974, the 
Court, under this same rule, held that a person served 
in New York could not be held in his capacity as exe-
cutor, where· the estate was not in New York and he had 
not been appointed there. 
In Sparnner v. Brandt, D. C. N. Y. 1941, 1 F.R.D. 555, 
the Court held that if a defendant is to be sued as a rep-
resentative so as to bind those for whom it may be· claim-
ed or alleged he is to act, it must be indicated that ilie 
defendant is being sued in "representative capacity" and 
not in his individual capacity. This bears also on the 
next ground discussed. 
3. Insufficiency of Process 
This ground goes to the procedure attempted here 
of filing a petition in a closed estate, to commence a 
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case against a fonner administrator therein, who has 
been expressly discharged. 
Ciril Rules 3 and 4, under "Comn1ence1nent of Ac-
tion" and "Process'', provide for a cmnplaint which shall 
set forth the names of all the parties and the aver1nent 
of claims, and for service of su1nmons entitled similarly 
to the complaint, and that the Court "shall have jurisdic-
tion from the ti1ne of filing of the cmnplaint or the ser-
vice of the summons." 
Thus, the parties are defined, the issues are defined 
and limited by this, and subsequent pleadings provided 
for and the subsequent rules as to intervening parties, 
or the bringing in of necessary parties can be applied, 
so that the whole matter involved can be settled. 
We have noted the provisions of 75-14-23 that "mis-
takes in settlement" may be corrected "at any time be-
fore final settlement and discharge, and after that time 
by an action in equity." 
This Court has held that under this statute a decree 
of distribution may be set aside only in an action in 
equity. In re Estate of Rice, 111 U. 428, 182 P. 2d 111; 
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 U. 128, 158 P. 705. This 
also is the general rule. 
21 .Am. Jur., 654, Sec. 488. 
Civil Rule 60 (b) is the rule dealing with relief frmn 
a final judgment and it recites seven different grounds 
upon which a motion may be made for such relief, none 
of which is taken by the appellants here, and says, with 
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reference to fraud, whether "denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic", the motion must be brought within "not more 
than 3 months after the judg1nent * * * was entered or 
taken." It then recites that pending such n1otion the 
••finality of a judgn1ent" is not suspended. That, of 
course, would mean that this estate would still be dis-
tributed and closed and the ad1ninistrators discharged, 
when appellants petition was filed. The rule then says: 
"The procedure for obtaining any relief from 
a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action." 
The reason for the rule now requiring procedure 
by "independent action" in equity is well illustrated by 
the confusion here brought about. 
11his respondent was cited on Nov. 1, 1951 (R. 157) 
simply by service of an order to show cause why it 
should not proceed with the probate proceedings closed 
more than six years before. Our motion to dismiss was 
filed (R. 155) Nov. 20, 1951. On their petition a copy 
of lis jJendens was filed, Nov. 1, 1951 (R. 150), des-
cribing all the real property mentioned and distributed 
Oct. 9, 1945. 
'V e were the only party and the only administrator 
then or in the year 1951 served at all. And, as the record 
shows, and as it already appears heTein, we had no 
control over the properties previously distributed and 
now in private ownership, and there was nothing that 
we rould do, if we had tried, to comply with the peti-
tion or order, whether we were ordered hy the Court, 
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or atten1pted ourselves to cmnply. Any action to divest 
title to real estate or to quiet title against any claim, 
or any settlement of such, could not be had by us. 
In fact, the record showed no authority in the peti-
tioner, Attorney Arnovitz, to then represent the appel-
lants. Of course, l\Ir. C-Thi still represented them, under 
the statutory amend1nent. The other fornwr joint 
administrator had not been served, and nobody could 
be bound by the procedure taken against this respon-
dent and, of course, any right of action against it must 
be determined as of the time this action was attempted, 
against it. 
Nor could this respondent bring in either the repre-
sentative of these appellants who had procured the set-
tlement complained about, and whose authority and 
conduct are qustioned by appellants' brief (p. 34) so 
as to fix responsibility for the agreement made by him, 
and for the decree consented to. And it could not bring 
in the owners or purported owners of the lands involved 
at all. 
There was, on March 5, 1952, a withdrawal (R. 173) 
filed by Mr. C-:M, and then by an order dated Aug. 1, 
1952 (R. 176) the attorneys who had filed the petition 
hack in 1951 were appointed as the attorneys for the 
appellants here. They were not the authorized attorneys 
before, because Mr. C-M was the attorney and they 
could not substitute themselves for hin1 under the pro-
visions of 78-51-34, at least until his withdrawal. 
This withdrawal, however, did not and could not 
relieve him from the provisions of fhe order or the 
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decree requ1nng him to "arrange for and insure" the 
payn1ent of the 1noney on deposit to these heirs, for which 
services he had been paid. And, of course, there is no 
claim by him, or at all, that it did. 
Now, as further wrong process and confusion, on 
Aug. 1, 1952 appellants filed another copy of their peti-
tion (R. 183), and another order to show cause was 
issued. So that, another case, if they could so start a 
case at all, was then started. So, from this, we had 
two separate fonner ad1ninistrators, neither one of which 
could ever act alone, involved in separate actions, 
separate motions to dismiss and separate orders; and 
the first one against this respondent involves a some-
what different situation because of intervening things, 
and some different questions of authority of attorneys, 
as noted above. And, in neither action can the appellants 
obtain any relief, that we can conceive of. 
The service of process attempted on this second 
order to show cause is noteworthy. 
On this the Sheriff got in to this confusion of pro-
ceeding against departed administrators, and served 
the summons upon the departed decedent himself. The 
return said (R. 182) that he had "served the same upon 
the within named defendant, John James Latsis, hy 
showing the original and delivering to • • • said defend-
ant personally * * * a true eopy of said order.'' If 
appellants' contentions are correct, we don't see any-
thing wrong about this. The decedent is just a~ logical 
a "defendant" in this as is either of these former adminis-
trators. 
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And now, after the orders of the Court here 
appealed from were entered below, and after the notice 
of appeal herein (R. 209) was served and filed, we have 
still another of the smne kind of petitions (R. 212) by 
one Sigmund Helwing, as administrator of Nick J. Latsis 
and as guardian of his minor children, and another like 
order to show cause, issued (R. 228) January 26, 1953. 
If such "cases" can be so brought in a closed probate 
proceeding, when do they stop~ Is this not an admis-
sion on our motion, that necessary parties plaintiff weTe 
not before the Court, and also that any decree entered 
on the first petition and order to show cause would not 
hind anybody! 
This presents still a different kind of case, because 
here is a further question of authority and representa-
tion, and as to getting title to the real properties aimed 
at, this case is started more than 7 years after the 
distribution, and, therefore, presents new defenses by 
parties who have been in possession. 
Appellants attempt to escape this situation and the 
statutes and decisions supra by reliance upon, In re 
Linford's Estate, 207 P. 2d 1033, which they cite (p. 37) 
and quote briefly. There weTe three equal heirs, and 
the sister filed a petition, had herself appointed as 
administratrix, listed only part of the properties at 
reducd values, did not list the complaining brother as 
an heir at all, and thus, kept him from receiving any 
notice and thus kept him away from Court, which is 
extrinsic fraud, and obtained sumrnary distribution to 
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herself of the whole estate. The Court, in the first 
paragraph of the opinion says: 
"The administratrix was not then and has 
not yet been discharged." 
Then, (207 P. :!d 1035), in citing a \Yashington case 
in support of its decision, this Court said that the pro-
ceeding could be taken by petition though the adminis-
trator's final account had been settled by the Court, 
"the administrator, not having been discharged, should 
be required to administer the omitted property." \Ve 
have admitted, of course, and the rules that we have 
relied upon permit correction of the account before final 
settlement, but not even this can be done after discharge 
of the adininistrator. And no case has been cited that 
then authorizes the procedure attempted here. 
Furthermore, in this Li.nford case there was no 
question of parties, everyone intere·sted, either as 
administrators or heirs, were there represented and the 
properties involved were all in the hands of the adminis-
tratrix who was an heir too, and under the Court's 
jurisdiction and control, and all matters could be given 
complete and final settlement. 
It cannot be too often en1phasized that this is not 
a case, where (1) probate proceedings were still pend-
ing when respondent was served; or (2) where all neces-
sary parties were before the Court; or, (3) where the 
properties or the parties holding them are before or 
within the jurisdiction of the Court~ or ( 4) where the 
parties had already joined issues and voluntarily liti-
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gated a non-probate 1natter, like quieting· title. ( ~ee 
In re Martin Esta.te, Utah 194G, 166 P.:2d 197.) 
Cases involving such situationt:', therefore, have no 
application here. 
And, the Court also points out in the Linford cases 
that it had previously decided In re Raleigh's Estate 
that even the "account is conclusive as to all iten1s 
included there, provided that the statutory requirement 
of notice has been complied with, and no heir or party 
is laboring under any legal disability, unless {he settle-
ment is set aside in a proceeding in equity * * * zJrose-
cuted as are proceedings to set aside other judgment.~." 
Appellants quote (p. 38) this portion of the opinion 
from the Raleigh case as it was there quoted by this 
Court, and then try to escape by emphasizing that the 
quotation said "provided that the statutory requirement 
of notice has been complied with." They make no con-
tention that anyone here was laboring under a legal 
disability and, of course, they were not. And they have 
not shown that any statutory requirement of notice 
was not complied with. The record shows in every 
instance where notice was required that it was given 
as the statute provided. 
Furthermore, and this is very vital on this as we 
have attempted to point out, everything that appellants 
are cmnplaining about and everything that they want 
by their complaint is encompassed in the words of 75-
14-25 "settlements, partitions and distributions of estate 
* * * and all other proceedings where notice is required 
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to prescribed" and the statute expressly says that in 
all such things l\1:r. C-:JI was here "authorized to repre-
sent such parties." 
Thus, it is ridiculous to argue lack of notice of 
proceedings which this representative promoted and 
brought about and participated in. 
In any event, this final judgment cannot now be 
attacked by the PROCESS here attempted. 
4. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can 
Be Granted. 
This is a very important ground of our motion to 
dismiss, because if we are right as to any of appellants' 
five points discussed above, or as to any of the other 
four grounds of our motion, and we think we are correct 
as to each and all of these, then the Court was right in 
sustaining this fourth ground of our motion also, because 
the petition did not state a claim upon which relief can 
be qranted. In addition to these, we desire to mention 
another matter showing such failure. 
There is no extrinsic fraud alleged in the petition 
or here claimed. And since the Court clearly had juris-
diction of the estate and had entered its final decree 
this, no matter what the process or procedure attempted, 
could not be set aside except for extrinsic fraud. 
In Glorer v. Gloz·er (1952), 242 P. 2d 298, thi~ Court. 
discussed this question quite thoroughly in an estate 
1na tter and so held. This case discusses the leading 
case of r.s. v. Throckmorton and holds the rule of that 
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case applicable to judg1nent in probate proceedings, a~ 
do other Courts. This Court also quotes and approves 
the definition of extrinsic fraud fr01u the A.L.R. An Jlo-
tation F ol. 113, P. 1:2.·1.;, as follows: 
" 'Extrinsic fraud 1nust consist of s01ne act 
ulterior to tne 1nerits of the proceeding out of 
which the judgment arose, by which the party 
attacking the judgment was prevented from pre-
senting his case or was induced not to present it. 
Such fraud consists of something done by the 
successful party, preventing the adverse party 
from presenting all of his case to the court, so 
that there was, in fact, no adversary trial or 
decision of the issue in that case.'" 
Since this case refers to some prior Utah cases it is 
not necessary to cite further authority. 
In Hammell v. Britton, 119 P.2d 333, a case cited 
by our Supreme Court on this question, the California 
Court emphasizes that as to extrinsic fraud the facts 
"must be pleaded with particularity and specificality." 
It also has a good statement distinguishing extrinsic and 
intrinsic fraud. Here, of course, no fraud is pleaded. 
This failure to allege extrinsic fraud in the present case 
presents a solid barrier to appellants here and inde-
pendently of everything else, justifies the order dis-
missing their petition. 
Before leaving this point and to avoid any mis-
-understanding, we also point out that the Court n1ay 
take judicial knowledge of what the record here shows. 
All of the matters of notice, orders, decrees here 
involved are contained in the complete record which is 
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before the Court. We point this out because the peti-
tion here makes a number of statements which the 
record proves to be erroneous. For example; the state-
ment therin (R. 163-64) that when the final decree was 
entered the administrator knew the money sent by appel-
lants' representative to them in Greece had not been 
accepted. The record (R. 137) shows that this was not 
returned and re-deposited until sometime after. Like-
wise, the statement (R. 166) "that the $1500.00 so sent 
was never out of possession" of the administrators. It 
wa~ made entirely available to appellants' attorney and 
representative for delivery through the Express Com-
pany or New York bank, as directed by the Court, and 
respondent was relieved of further responsibility and 
discharged. 
Also, the statement (R. 171) that the Court "has 
not entered a final order discharging the administrators 
of the estate," whereas there was an order expressly 
di.,charging them (R. 131). These are not all, but they 
me some samples. 
It is true that the appellants' brief does not now 
as~ert or rely upon such statements in the petition. In 
fact, they scarcely refer in their brief here to their 
petition at all. The point we make, however, as to an~' 
and all statements in the petition, or in the brjef, con-
trar:v to what the Court ma)' take judicial notice of, are 
not admitted by our motion and can be given no effect 
here, but must be treated as mere nullities. 
French v. Senate, (Cal.), 80 P. 1031, 69 L.R.A. 
;>;)( i, a leading case. 
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State v. Bates. :22 lJ. 65, 61 P. 902. 
Utah Power (f· Lt. Co. l'. Richmond Irr. Co., 80 U. 
105, 13 P. 2d 320. 
78-25-1 U.C.A. 1953. 
20 Am. Jur., P. 104. 
State v. Rolio, 71 U. 91, 262 P. 987, where this 
Court said: 
"* * * and what is judicially known may not 
be controverted by pleadings, or made issuable 
by them." 
5. Fail1.tre to Join an Indispensible Party. 
This ground has been covered in the discussion of 
the other grounds, above. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it can, we think, be safely asserted 
that appellants have not shown that any Court has 
heretofore been asked to, or ever has entertained such 
a petition filed in a former probate proceeding thereto-
fore closed by a formal final decree, and seeking to 
gain title or quiet title to real estate likewise forn1ally 
distributed six years prior thereto, and which petition 
is directed to a former administrator, likewise by such 
decree, theretofore discharged. 
On the 1nerits of their contention we believe it is 
established that the ntere statement in the stipulation 
that certain documents if signed would bind the heirs 
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signing, was not intended to prevent the stipulated 
settlement from then taking effect; and, if it was at 
first so intended, this was changed by the acts and 
conduct of all the same parties who had signed this 
stipulation, and was not carried forward as a condition 
to the finality of the decree thereafter agreed to, entered, 
and accepted and acted upon by all. 
That :.Mr. Cotro-~1anes was fully qualified and 
authorized to represent and act for the minor and 
foreign heirs, and all the interests claimed by appellants, 
and in all the "settlements, partitions and distributions" 
agreed to and finally made. And, in fact, in doing all 
that is now complained of, and that respondent could 
not then or now control or limit the authority of appel-
lants' representative. And that it cannot be made 
responsible therefor in this proceeding. 
That not only is the process and the procedure 
attempted here erroneous, and futile, but that the things 
pretended to be sought by way of fractional interests 
in scattered properties would be of no value to appel-
lants, and could not sensibly be permitted as a di~tri­
bution. 
Also, that any interest in the property of the estate 
that these heirs might htave claim'ed was "subject to 
administration," and, so, was subject to be changed 
therein, by partition and distribution ·provisions of the 
statutes under the agreement between the heirs them-
selves as to their respective portions, and by the "settle-
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ments, partitions and distributions" agreed to by the 
appellants, and ordered by the Court. 
It seems, also, to have been fully demonstrated that 
this final decree, was just that, and that it can be set 
aside, if at all, only by proper process and in an equity 
suit with jurisdiction acquired over the subject 1natter 
and all necessary parties; and then only upon allegations 
and proof of extrinsic fraud. 
We respectfully submit that respondent's motion 
was well taken and properly sustained and that the 
order thereon dismissing appellants' petition should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & 
MULLINER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Utah Savings & Trust Company 
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